This article examines the constitutional, historical, moral, and economic foundations of women’s reservation in the Indian Parliament. Using election data from 1952–2024, comparative international evidence, and empirical research on the governance outcomes of women’s political participation, it argues that the absence of operative reservation constitutes a constitutional dereliction, democratic anomaly, and economic cost. Although women comprise approximately 50 per cent of India’s population and electorate, they hold only 13.63 per cent of Lok Sabha seats—below both the global average (27.6%) and the South Asian average. While the Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, 2023 mandates a minimum 33 per cent reservation, it remains unimplemented. The article traces the four-decade legislative history of women’s reservation, situates India comparatively, and builds an economic case using human capital theory, labour economics, and evidence from India’s Panchayati Raj institutions. It also examines the social implications of women’s empowerment in India’s predominantly patrilineal society, arguing that women’s multitasking capacities developed within these communities are a significant yet underrecognised governance asset. It concludes that a standalone constitutional amendment implementing reservation in existing constituencies through a rotational mechanism is both constitutionally valid and substantively necessary.